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Introduction
In 2017, more than twenty years after the launch of the Barcelona Process, it is obvious 
that European stability cannot be separated from regional security, political stability, and 
sustainable economic development of the Mediterranean area. Europe is under the pressure 
due to migration crises in the Mediterranean area, and fragile and quasi-failing states 
(Syria, Libya) and even religious extremism (SISIS) have posed serious challenges for 
the EU foreign policy. It is not surprising, therefore, that after the review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015, there has been a greater emphasis on stability in 
the relations between the EU and its neighbours.
The Mediterranean region (cradle of modern civilization) is composed of 22 coun-
tries around the coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea, and covers portions of three 
continents: Africa, Asia and Europe. The aim of the Euro–Mediterranean cooperation 
was to connect the Northern and Southern shores on the Mediterranean Sea. In our days 
the costal part of West Balkans also belongs to the Mediterranean. It is the consequence of 
specific historical events that the countries located on the Adriatic shores and belonging 
to the Mediterranean, originally were not part of the cooperation. Due to the fact that at 
the time of the establishment of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership these countries were 
part of the still existing Yugoslavia, where one war followed the other and the state was 
literally disintegrating, joining the process was not a realistic option.
The European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) started in 1995 with the launch of 
the Barcelona Process “to create an area of peace, stability, security and shared economic 
prosperity, with full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, while promoting mutual understanding between cultures and civilisations in 
the Euro-Mediterranean region.” (Barcelona Declaration 1995) Despite its success in several 
cases, the EU and the Partner Countries now face a worsening situation in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region, and the Eurocentric approach of this partnership is 
debated by external and internal actors. (Huber–Paciello 2016)
Following the end of the bipolar world, the EU developed the ambitious goal of 
 becoming a real “player” in the MENA region. Although the United States dominated the so-
called “Enlarged Mediterranean” or the “Greater Middle East”, new threats and challenges 
to international security and stability (e.g. international terrorism and radicalisation) made it 
clear that the Mediterranean policy of the EU needed rethinking. After the end of the bipolar 
international system, firstly in a unipolar, and then, since the end of the millennium, in an 
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even more complicated and constantly changing multi-polar international system, the role 
of the Mediterranean has been increasing again and again. (Ehtesham–Mohammadi 2017)
In my paper firstly I describe the historical background of the relations between 
the Mediterranean region and the EU. Secondly in order to carry out my analysis I give 
a brief introduction to the development of the Euro–Med relations. After describing 
the contemporary institutional relations and the budget and financial tools, finally I analyse 
the results and challenges of the cooperation.
Historical Background
The EU member states have been linked to the countries of the Southern Mediterranean 
for centuries. Although this region has similar characteristics and common historical back-
ground, the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean Region are characterized 
by contradictions: secular versus religious, democracy versus authoritarian regime, rich 
versus poor, high level of industrialisation versus low level of industrialization, integrated 
versus disintegrated region, eldering population versus young population. On the other 
hand, there are strong interdependencies on several issues (energy, migration, economy) 
between the two parts.
The relationship between the EC–EU and the Mediterranean region goes back to 
the period of the bipolar system. Until the 1990s the EC created four types of relations 
with the Mediterranean states: firstly, preferential trade agreements (1969 with Morocco, 
Algeria, and Tunisia; 1975 with Israel);  secondly, association agreements; thirdly, 
cooperation agreements; and fourthly, accession agreements. The association agreements, 
for European countries, meant preparation for accession (e.g. Greece in 1962, Turkey 
1963), while the cooperation agreements for non-European countries provided trade 
preferences (e.g. Morocco in 1976). Within the framework of the Global Mediterranean 
Policy (PMG) launched in 1972, the European Community (EC) negotiated bilateral trade 
and co-operation agreements with Southern Mediterranean countries (with the exception 
of Libya) to strengthen commercial, economic, financial and social cooperation.1 During 
the process of the Southern enlargement in the 1980s, accession agreements came into force 
with the European Mediterranean countries (Greece in 1981, Spain in 1986).
In June 1990, the European Commission proposed a new Mediterranean policy for 
the Period 1992–1996. This new strategy, known as the Renovated Mediterranean Policy 
(RMP), increased the budget for financial co-operation with the Mediterranean region 
on the initiative of the Southern European countries. (Molnár–Siposs 2011) In Rome in 
December 1990 a sub-regional cooperation was decided on, following the French recom-
mendation. The planned cooperation was to connect the Northern and Southern shores of 
the Mediterranean Sea. The “4 + 5” Group was created by four countries of the European 
Community (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and the five countries of the Arab Maghreb 
Union (UMA); subsequently the group developed into “5 + 5” with the accession of Malta.2 
1 Euro–Mediterranean cooperation (historical). Source: http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterrane-
an-cooperation/euro-mediterranean-cooperation-historical (Accessed: 30.01.2018)
2 Created in 1989 by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia with the aim of promoting the process 
of integration among the countries of the Great Maghreb.
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The initial success of this cooperation was limited due to its mainly economic objectives. 
Following the Gulf War, the Algerian crisis and the “Lockerbie” case of Libya the initiative 
lost its buoyancy. (Molnár 2011, 70.)
In 1990, during the Italian Presidency of the Council, the Italian Foreign Minister, 
Gianni De Michelis, supported by Spain, unsuccessfully proposed the creation of 
a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean region (CSCM), following 
the example of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). (Carnovale 
1995, 226.) The idea was to create a structured cooperation on the basis of comprehensive se-
curity approach of the three-pillar system of the CSCE. (De Perini 2018) Despite the failure 
of the CSCM proposal, the RMP eventually led to the creation of the Euro–Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP). In 1995, during the Barcelona Euro–Mediterranean ministerial meeting, 
representatives of fifteen EU member states and eleven Mediterranean countries, together 
with Palestine authorities, signed the so-called Barcelona Declaration. This document is 
divided into chapters on the political and security, economic, and socio-cultural “baskets” 
of the partnership. These three key areas, following the successful model of the OSCE, 
the Barcelona Declaration thus intended to create a zone of peace, stability, security, shared 
prosperity and deepen the dialogue between the cultures of the Mediterranean area. (Bin 
1997, 3; Molnár 2011, 70.)
The Barcelona Declaration renewed relations in several ways. It was, for example, 
the first time that cultural dialogue received an important role. Thus, the EU recognized as 
its equal partners the countries situated on the Southern shore of the Mediterranean, treating 
them not merely as a market for European products, energy providing centres, or migration 
resources. It also played an important role in strengthening civil society and facilitating 
dialogue and partnership, and deepening cooperation. In launching the Barcelona process, 
the EU chose to apply soft power in hopes that the fundamental values of the European 
Union would take root in the partner states with the consideration of the local characteristics.
The importance of the Southern region declined during the Eastern enlargement that 
took place in the 2000s, as the EU rethought its financial and institutional framework. 
Among the twelve new member states there were only three Mediterranean countries 
(Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia), and having new borders to the East the Southern region pro-
visionally lost its strategic importance. After publishing the Strategy Paper on the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, the conception of a Wider Europe gave a new definition to 
the EU’s outlook; European neighbourhood relations: as relations with the Mediterranean 
countries were placed on a political level similar to the relationship between the EU and 
its Eastern neighbours. (European Commission 2004) Following the so called “big bang” 
enlargement in 2004, the ENP hoped to create a “Ring of Friends” around the EU by 
strengthening bilateral relations with the partner countries.
In 2005, the “Year of the Mediterranean”, the Barcelona Summit reinforced the EMP, 
adding migration as a fourth key area. The EMP continued as the multilateral forum for 
dialogue and cooperation, while the ENP guaranteed bilateral relations through association 
agreements and actions plans with the partner countries. Since the 1990s the EU has 
signed new types of association agreement with the Southern Mediterranean countries 
(with the exception of Syria and Libya) after 1999. Today one of the main goals of these 
agreements has been to create a deep Euro–Mediterranean free trade area. The bilateral 
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relations reinforced by the Action Plans3 were complemented by the multilateral partnership 
of the Barcelona Process. (The Euro–Mediterranean Free Trade 2010)
In February 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy, then French Minister of Internal Affairs, proposed 
the establishment of a Mediterranean Union connecting the seven Mediterranean EU 
countries and the non-EU member states on the shores with a kind of reinforced integration 
and cooperation. In December 2007, German Chancellor Angela Merkel criticized the idea, 
claiming it risked splitting the EU. Merkel argued that “cooperation between some member 
states has to be also open to the rest and it has to be approved by all member states. […] It 
cannot be that some countries establish a Mediterranean Union and fund this with money 
from EU coffers”. (Mahony 2007) Merkel highlighted the importance of the equilibrium 
between the Southern and Eastern dimensions of the European neighbourhood policy. 
(Horváth 2008)
As a compromise, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was established without 
a separate budget in 2008, when France held the presidency of the EU. The union was 
significantly weaker than the French proposal and, the six main areas of the UfM (the 
environment and water, transport and urban development, business development, energy, 
higher education and research, and civil protection) emphasized the economic aspects of 
relations. (Molnár 2011; Euro–Mediterranean Partnership) Thanks to these compromises, 
the EMP was re-launched by the partner states with the aim of giving new vitality to 
the partnership. At the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean in 2008, EU member states 
and their Mediterranean partners (representatives of 43 countries) decided to construct 
The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean on the basis of the Barcelona 
Declaration. (Joint Declaration 2008) The Barcelona Process remained the predecessor of 
the Union for the Mediterranean. In November 2008, the Marseille meeting of the Euro–
Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs introduced a new institutional structure 
including the co-presidency representing the EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries.
Although the failure of the EMP has never been declared officially, its relaunch in 2005 
and the creation of the UfM in 2008 implied it. The success of the EMP, and of moderni-
sation and democratisation, depends not only on the EU, but also on the political will and 
capacity of the neighbouring countries taking part in the process. National ownership has 
an unquestionable role.
Development of the Euro–Med Relations
Today the EMP, in the framework of the UfM, comprises all twenty-eight member states 
of the European Union and fifteen partner states across the Southern Mediterranean 
and the Middle East.4 Members face common problems, such as maritime pollution and 
3 The Action Plans are political documents on the agenda, objectives and priorities for future relations, contains 
the following key areas: 1. political dialogue and reform; 2. economic and social cooperation and development; 
3. trade related issues, market and regulatory reform; 4. cooperation on justice, liberty and security; 5. sectoral 
issues including transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development; 6. the human 
dimension covering people-to-people contacts, civil society, education and public health.
4 Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, 
Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
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maritime safety, energy or higher education issues and business development. (Union for 
the Mediterranean 2017a)
Since the late 1990s, the Euromed Association Agreements between the EU 
and the Mediterranean partner states (MPS) provide the basis for bilateral relations, while 
on the institutional level the former three pillars of the Barcelona Process have been filled 
up by the multi-lateral forums of the Euro–Med dialogue.
The European Union concluded seven Euro–Med association agreements between 1998 
and 2011. These agreements set out a framework for North-South political dialogue. They 
also promoted the gradual liberalisation of trade in the Mediterranean area. Negotiations to 
deepen these association agreements through the establishment of deep and comprehensive 
free trade areas and further liberalisation of trade continue today. (Euro–Mediterranean 
Partnership s. a.a)
In December 2008, Syria and the EU started negotiations on an association agreement. 
In May 2011, following the events of the Arab Spring, the EU decided it would not “take 
further steps with regard to the association agreement with Syria and, therefore, the signing 
of the agreement is not on the agenda.” (European Council 2011) Following the deterioration 
of the security environment, negotiations for a framework agreement between the European 
Union and Libya halted as well. Libya remains outside the ENP, but could join financial 
support programs, like the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument ENPI. Libya 
enjoys observer status in the UfM. (Euro–Mediterranean Partnership s. a.a)
Table 1.
Euro–Mediterranean Association Agreements
Partner End of negotiations Date of signature Entry into force
Tunisia June 1995 June 1995 March 1998
Israel September 1995 November 1995 June 2000
Morocco November 1995 February 1996 March 2000
Palestine December 1995 February 1997 July 1997
Jordan April 1997 November 1997 May 2002
Egypt June 1999 June 2001 June 2004
Algeria December 2001 April 2002 September 2005
Lebanon January 2002 May 2002 April 2006
Syria currently suspended — —
Libya currently suspended — —
Mauritania — — —
Source: Euro–Mediterranean Partnership s. a.a
The Euro–Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has developed over the past decades 
bringing about a new regional approach that formed the basis of creating the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and later the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Nowadays 
the EU’s Mediterranean policy is based on the framework of these two institutionalized 
programs which are formally connected. The mainly multilateral framework is supported 
by the UfM created in 2008 on the basis of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership launched 
in 1995 by the Barcelona Declaration, while the European Neighbourhood Policy created in 
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2004 provides a primarily bilateral form of cooperation based on association agreements and 
Action Plans; the UfM complements the ENP. We have to emphasise that ENP, having two 
dimensions, was based on two “polices”: the Eastern and the Mediterranean Partnership.
The geographic extent of the UfM is larger than the Southern dimension of the ENP. 
The UfM contains not only the member states of the EU and the Southern Mediterranean 
partners of the ENP, but also Turkey, Mauritania, and the Balkan countries situated 
on the Adriatic Sea. When the EMP was created, Yugoslavia was “disintegrating” and 
participation in the Partnership was not an option. The EU later signed stabilization and 
association agreements with these Western Balkan countries to prepare them for the EU 
accession and to advance regional cooperation. (Molnár 2011, 73.)
Member states of the European Union Other ENP countries (all but Libya are UfM members)
UfM members, which are not ENP countries, part of the EU or 
its enlargement agenda
Russia
EU enlargement agenda
ENP countries
Figure 1.
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
Source: Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Neighbourhood_Policy
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Member states of the European Union Suspended members
ObserversOther members
Figure 2.
Union for the Mediterranean member states
Source: Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_the_Mediterranean
Holding out real prospects of EU membership allows the EU to influence its partner coun-
tries. In such cases there are fewer conflicts of interests between the economic or security 
interests of the EU and its member states, and its partners appear more determined to launch 
reforms and fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. In cases of the Northern and Eastern 
countries (Greece, Spain, the Western Balkans), the EU played a much more effective role 
in the process of reform (effective Europeanisation). (Featherstone–Radaelli 2003) 
For the countries of the Southern Mediterranean Basin, however, which lacked any real 
chance to join, the EU leadership has been less successful, coupled with scarce funding 
opportunities; with different socio-economic and political development of these SMP 
countries, the EU has not been able to fulfil a major incentive role for the implementation 
of real political and economic reforms. The European Union and its member states serve, 
in a limited way, as models of modernization for the region, but this is sometimes still 
overshadowed by distrust from the colonial past.
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The Mediterranean policy of the EU (and its MSs) can be understood in the framework 
of three aspects in which the goals laid down in the Treaties and the practice are oscillating 
between several extremes: 1. normative/liberal and realist approaches; 2. political, cultural 
or legal values vs. economic and security reasons; and 3. policies supporting bottom-up or 
top-down development. The combinations differ depending on the security environment 
of the region and the political will of European governments. Regional policies using 
multilateral or bilateral frameworks augment EU efforts. (Molnár 2016)
One of the novelties of the UfM was the concept of co-ownership. Although the UfM 
provides a multilateral framework for the Southern dimension of the ENP, it is a separate 
international organisation, and it has more members than the ENP. As a direct continuation 
of the Barcelona Process (EMP), it is inspired by the goals defined in the Barcelona 
Declaration. Until the events of the Arab Spring, however, the EMP and the UfM had 
little impact on the economic development and democratisation processes of the Southern 
neighbours whose development model differs from the European one. The persistent 
Arab–Israeli conflict and the events of the Arab Spring, as well as weak initial economic 
results and some bureaucratic arguments about the institutional structure of the UfM 
weakened cooperation and inspired scepticism among the Southern Mediterranean partners.
After the events of the Arab Spring it was clear the ENP and the UfM had to be re-
thought and changed fundamentally. The structure and the working method of the UfM were 
established subsequently. The EU recognised its limited role in the region, as highlighted 
by a report of the European Parliament:
“The Arab Spring has had the effect of a wake-up call for the EU. It illustrated the lim-
itations of the ‘stability versus human rights’ paradigm and prompted a fundamental 
rethinking of EU policies. Double standards in the past have undermined the EU’s 
credibility in the Arab world and have created a mistrust of its intentions. In response to 
the Arab Spring, the EU has promised to shift away from ‘business as usual’ to ensure that 
support for human rights and democracy will be central to its cooperation in its Southern 
neighbourhood. Enabling civil society to function, to advocate for citizens’ priorities and 
rights and to hold governments and donors to account, is an essential part of supporting 
reforms that build sustainable democracy. Positive and negative incentives will also have to 
be applied as appropriate, and benchmarks developed to assess progress in human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law.” (European Parliament 2012, 5.)
The ENP was under review and, in 2011, a consensus emerged that the renewed policy must 
concentrate more on issues related to good governance and respect for human rights. A new 
incentive approach based on the principles of differentiation was elaborated. The so-called 
3M (Money, Markets, and Mobility) of Catherine Ashton, former EEAS HR, was introduced 
in the framework of the ENP. (Ashton 2011) These connected democratic reforms with 
financial support: the country that has more results in the democratic reform progress 
receives more financial aid, more possible mobility of legal migration, and more access to 
the European market.
In 2011, despite the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
the EU was unprepared to face the challenges created by the Arab Spring. The financial 
and sovereign debt crisis hit several EU MSs and decreased the effectiveness of EU 
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crisis management capacities. The EU MSs responded slowly and in a contradictory 
fashion to the 2011 crisis in the MENA region. Opinion held that the then-existing 
authoritarian regimes could not guarantee regional stability and security in the long-term, 
and democratisation processes were highlighted. The emerging security challenges forced 
a rethinking of the conceptual framework of the ENP, as well. The European Commission 
(EC) subsequently reshaped the ENP, proposing a different approach for each country, 
and the EU decided to offer “more for more”. The new approach emphasised sustainable 
democracy through the 3M incentives.
European politicians initially were optimistic about the democratisation processes 
in the MENA region, and about the EU’s role as an external promoter of democracy. 
The EU institutions firmly stood by the need to support the transition to democracy. This 
was manifested in several documents and statements, but the question remained: were 
the EU and the MSs really ready and able to support these ambitious objectives? European 
politicians sometimes oversimplified these processes, making simplistic analogies between 
the 1989 Central and Eastern European changes and the Arab Spring. (Rompuy 2012)
Political events in Egypt (2013), along with the migration and refugee crisis caused by 
military conflicts and fragile states (e.g. Syria and Libya), highlighted the issue of security 
again. In March 2015, the European Commission and the European External Action Service 
initiated a public consultation with governments, academia, and civil society organisations, 
both within the EU and in the ENP partner countries, to realise the extensive review of 
the ENP. Following the consultation period, the revision of the ENP was finalised in 
2015. (Joint Communication 2015) EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn stated that: “New 
challenges, from violent conflicts in our neighbourhood to uncontrolled migration, from 
organized crime and terrorism to energy stoppages, all demand a robust European answer. 
We have to become smarter at exporting stability. If not, Europe will keep importing 
instability. As one observer has remarked, the “ring of friends” the EU originally aimed 
for, has become a “ring of fire”.” (Hahn 2015)
On 18 November 2015, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and the European Commission presented the main lines of the review of the ENP, 
which offered “more tailor-made, more differentiated partnerships between the EU and 
each of its neighbouring partners to reflect different ambitions, abilities and interests”. 
(Joint Communication 2015, 4.) The review emphasised that greater mutual ownership and 
joint responsibility of the partners is more successful in supporting reforms than the EU’s 
approach based on the “more for more” principle:
“The incentive-based approach (“More for More”) has been successful in supporting 
reforms in the fields of good governance, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, 
where there is a commitment by partners to such reforms. However, it has not proven 
a sufficiently strong incentive to create a commitment to reform, where there is not 
the political will.” (Joint Communication 2015, 5.)
Although the ENP has been trying to encourage reforms recognising the specific features 
of each country, in general it has not had enough time to show real results in most cases; 
Tunisia is an exception.
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In 2015, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Vice-President of 
the European Commission (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini, turning away from the Eurocentric 
approach of the previous Mediterranean policy, argued that:
“We should switch from the idea that the European Union is at the centre, surrounded 
by the neighbouring countries, to the idea of a new partnership based on cooperation. 
A stronger partnership with our neighbours is key for the European Union, while we face 
many challenges within our borders and beyond. We are confronted with threats that are 
global and have to be tackled by the international community in a united way. We have 
to build together a safer environment, try to solve the many crises of our common region, 
support the development and the growth of the poorest areas, and address the root causes 
of migration.” (ENP Review 2015)
Mogherini singled out five pillars of the work: “First, focus on economic development 
and job creation;  second, cooperation on energy; third, security; fourth, migration; fifth, 
neighbours of the neighbours” to “strengthen together the resilience of our and our partners’ 
societies, and our ability to effectively work together on our common purposes.” (ENP 
Review 2015) This meant, again, an emphasis on the economic and security aspects of 
this policy framework that would lead to a “more than partnership, less than membership 
relation”, but without a new security strategy the real strategic framework was still unclear.
In preparation for the new security strategy of the EU, and parallel with the review 
of the ENP, in December 2013, the European Council gave a mandate to the High 
Representative, in close co-operation with the European Commission, to “assess the impact 
of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 2015 
on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with 
the Member States”. (European Council 2013) The report on the strategic review was 
presented to the European Council in June 2015. The European Union in a Changing 
Global Environment, A More Connected, Contested and Complex World warns that: “the 
EU’s ‘soft power’ is waning as the memory of the ‘big bang’ enlargement recedes and other 
actors strive for influence in its neighbourhood. Today’s challenge is to revive the reform 
momentum through credible policies of integration and association.” (Missiroli 2016, 139.)
During this time, the structure of the UfM was also rethought. With the accession 
of the Central and East European member states and the creation of the UfM, the EMP 
expanded to include twenty-eight EU member states and fifteen Mediterranean countries. 
Since the creation of the UfM, cooperation has gone through three phases. Between 2008 
and 2011, under the co-presidency of France and Egypt, cooperation in the framework of 
the UfM was launched, and the Secretariat of the UfM in Barcelona was set up. Between 
2012 and 2015, under the co-presidency of the European Union and Jordan, the capacities of 
the Secretariat were reinforced, the working methods of partnerships were elaborated, and 
the activities of the UfM were increased, giving new momentum to Euro–Mediterranean 
regional cooperation. Following the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
meetings of foreign affairs ministers of the UfM took place in November 2015 and January 
2017 in Barcelona to start a new phase of cooperation. Since 2016, considering the serious 
challenges in the Mediterranean region and the opportunities there, the UfM’s identity and 
added value was highlighted. Further consolidation of this regional cooperation has been 
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started to create an “enhanced common regional agenda for the Mediterranean in order to 
effectively and collectively address the current challenges.” (Union for the Mediterranean 
2017b, 1.) The 2016 annual report of the UfM noted three priorities of regional integration 
(regional human development; regional stability; and regional integration) to be addressed 
through a “pragmatic and ambitious approach”. (Union for the Mediterranean 2017c, 6.)
Figure 3.
Development of the Union for the Mediterranean
Source: Union for the Mediterranean 2017a, 8.
In January 2017, the ministers of foreign affairs approved a strategic document as a road 
map (RM) for strengthening the UfM as the expression of co-ownership in tackling 
the common challenges to regional stability, human development and regional integration 
in the Mediterranean. According to the document, forty-seven regional cooperation projects 
worth more than 5 billion Euros in total have been labelled under the umbrella of UfM. 
The document highlighted the security-development nexus yet again, stating that: “there is 
no development without security and no security without development.” With the adoption 
of the RM, the ministers of foreign affairs of the forty-three UfM countries agreed to 
strengthen the role of the UfM in enhancing regional cooperation and integration in 
the Mediterranean. The four areas for action were: 1. enhancing political dialogue amongst 
the member states; 2. ensuring the contribution of UfM activities to regional stability and 
human development; 3. strengthening regional integration; and 4. consolidating UfM 
capacity for action. (Union for the Mediterranean 2017b, 4.)
Contemporary Institutional Relations
The Union for the Mediterranean has a North-South co-presidency, currently exercised 
by the External Action Service of the EU, representing EU Member States, and Jordan, 
representing the Mediterranean partners. In 2012, the Council of the EU (FAC Conclusions 
of February 2012) decided that the High Representative assumes the Northern co-presidency 
when the Union for the Mediterranean takes the format of Foreign Ministers Meetings. 
The Commission assumes the Northern co-presidency during Ministerial Meetings 
that solely concern matters falling within areas of exclusive UfM competence. The EU 
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External Action Service leads the Senior Official Meetings of the UfM for the Northern 
co-presidency. (Union for the Mediterranean 2016a)
The UfM secretariat headquartered in Barcelona is in charge of identifying and 
promoting activities like regional projects in different sectors. The current head (Secretary 
General) of the Secretariat is Fathallah Sijilmassi. The Secretariat of the UfM is financed by 
contributions from the European Union (50%) and the partner states (50%). The activities 
of the Secretariat are overseen and coordinated by the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) 
which consists of Senior Officials from the ministries of foreign affairs of the forty-three 
countries. This body approves the budget and work programme of the Secretariat. It is 
also in charge of preparing the Ministerial Meetings. It also examines project proposals, 
guaranteeing coherence with the guidelines derived from the Summit of Heads of State and 
Government, and from the Ministerial Meetings. The SOM takes decisions by consensus. 
(Euro–Mediterranean Partnership s. a.b; Union for the Mediterranean 2016b)
The Union for the Mediterranean has the following six priority areas: 1. business devel-
opment; 2. social and civil affairs; 3. higher education and research; 4. transport and urban 
development; 5. water and environment; and 6. energy and climate action. The UfM has 
a number of key projects managed by the Secretariat: the de-pollution of the Mediterranean 
Sea; the establishment of maritime and land highways; a joint civil protection programme 
on prevention, preparation, and response to natural and man-made disasters; development 
of alternative energy sources; the creation of Euro–Mediterranean Universities (in 2008 
in Slovenia, in 2016 in Morocco); and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, 
which supports small businesses. (Union for the Mediterranean 2016a)
The partnership co-operation and dialogue that was established by the Barcelona 
Declaration is based on several institutions and forums. The Conferences of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs (CMFA) and the Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) are responsible for 
the discussion regarding all dimensions of the partnership. The ministerial meetings, 
including sectorial meetings, are also the main bodies of multilateral and regional 
cooperation, responsible for the economic and cultural cooperation and dialogue, as well 
as the all-embracing development of the partnership. Ministerial conferences have been 
called on different thematic fields such as water management, industry, energy, migration, 
tourism, cultural heritage and culture, and the environment.
Since 2004 the Euro–Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA), a body for 
political cooperation, has become one of the most important institutions of the Barcelona 
Process. The first consultative parliamentary forum was organised in 1998, and it became 
a genuine EMPA in 2004 on the basis of the proposal of the European Parliament. The EP 
resolution was approved by the fifth Euro–Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers 
(Valencia, April 2002). The EMPA held its first session in Greece in March 2004. In 2010 in 
Amman, the EMPA’s name was changed to Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM (PA–UfM).
The main roles of this separate consultative parliamentary body of the UfM are: 
“enhancing the visibility and transparency of the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership and 
bringing its work closer to the interests and expectations of the public; [and] adding 
democratic legitimacy and support to regional cooperation.” (Parliamentary Assembly s. a.a) 
The PA–UfM, which works in close cooperation with the UfM Secretariat, holds at least 
one plenary session annually and has a total of 280 members, equally distributed between 
the Northern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean (140–140). The PA–UfM has an 
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annual presidency that is held in rotation by the four members of the bureau, ensuring 
parity and alternation between South and North chairs. The presidency of the bureau has 
been held by the EP (2012–2013), Jordan (2013–2014), Portugal (2014–2015), Morocco 
(2015–2016) and Italy (2016–2017). (Parliamentary Assembly s. a.b) There are five standing 
committees within the PA–UfM: the Committee on Political Affairs, Security, and Human 
Rights; the Committee on Economic and Financial Affairs, Social Affairs, and Education; 
the Committee on Improving Quality of Life, Exchanges between Civil Societies and 
Culture; the Committee on Energy, Environment, and Water; and the Committee on 
Women’s Rights in the Euro–Med Countries. The PA–UfM adopts non-binding resolutions 
or recommendations. (Parliamentary Assembly s. a.b)
To promote dialogue between cultures and civilizations within the framework of social, 
cultural, and human partnership, in 2005, the Anna Lindh Foundation was established in 
Alexandria. It has become the largest network of civil-society organisations, and its goal 
is to promote the inter-cultural dialogue in the Mediterranean area. It has worked from 
the beginning as a network of national networks, and now contains more than 4,000 member 
networks, including NGOs, public institutions, universities, foundations, local and regional 
authorities, individuals and private organisations. (Anna Lindh Foundation s. a.)
The European Neighbourhood Policy complements the UfM with bilateral relations 
between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries. Cooperation in the framework 
of the ENP builds upon several Association Agreements (AA) between the EU and 
the partner countries. On the basis of the AA’s bilateral Action Plans (AP), the EU 
and the ENP partner countries in the Southern Mediterranean region (except Libya, Syria, 
and Algeria) agreed to launch a political and economic reform agenda for a period of three or 
five years. The goals of the ENP, such as reforms to democratisation or economic integration 
are supported by the financial funds of the EU, mainly by the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI).
Every year from 2015, ENP progress reports were published by the EEAS and 
the Commission to describe the development of reforms in the neighbouring countries. 
Since the review of the ENP, the progress reports have been replaced by association 
implementation reports that assess the state of implementation by the partner country and 
by the EU. These documents focus on the progress toward key reforms agreed between 
the two parties.
Budget and Financial Tools
Between 1994 and 2004, the main financial tool of the Barcelona Process was the MEDA 
Program (similar to the PHARE and TACIS programs), with additional loans available 
from the European Investment Bank. For the MEDA I programme (1994–1999) 3.4 billion 
Euros, and for the MEDA II programme (2000–2006) 5.4 billion Euros were allocated. 
Following the establishment of the ENP and for the programming period 2007–2013, MEDA 
(and TACIS) were replaced by a single financial instrument, the European Neighbourhood 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI), with approximately €12 billion available. In the 2014–2020 
period, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, ENI promotes the fulfilment of the ENP 
objectives, for which 15.4 billion Euros have been allocated.
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The implementation of reforms is supported by geographic instruments, like the ENI, 
and by thematic instruments, like the Civil Society Facility (CSF). There are other EU 
instruments and programmes to promote partnership with neighbouring countries (like 
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Non-State Actors 
and Local Authorities in Development (NSA–LA), and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). 
“The EIDHR is designed to help civil society become an effective force for political reform and 
defence of human rights. Building on its key strength, which is the ability to operate without 
the need for host government consent, the EIDHR is able to focus on sensitive political issues 
and innovative approaches and to cooperate directly with local civil society organisations 
which need to preserve independence from public authorities, providing for great flexibility 
and increased capacity to respond to changing circumstances.” (EIDHR s. a.) The European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) provide loans, as well.
The Western Balkans and Turkey are in the pre-accession process and, as candidates 
and potential candidates for membership in the EU, are not covered under the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy. These countries therefore do not belong to the area of the ENP. In 
2007, in place of all previous pre-accession programs, the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA) was introduced by the European Commission to help all pre-accession 
activities in candidate and potential candidate countries. Under the financial framework of 
2014–2020, the part of the Western Balkans that belongs to the Mediterranean receives EU 
funding through IPA II. (Molnár 2011, 73.)
The Union for the Mediterranean has no budget from which to finance its activities and 
projects, since it was conceived as an instrument to mobilise private funds from investment 
and development banks and other international bodies.
Results and Challenges
The EU, as a normative-civilian power, (Manners 2002) has placed great emphasis 
on the protection, spread, and voluntary acceptance of its principles (peace, freedom, 
democracy, the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, respect for human 
dignity) by third countries, particularly in the MENA region. (Whitman 2011, 1–25.) 
It is not surprising that the EU’s Mediterranean policy has been criticised by several 
stakeholders, like the Southern partner states, experts, and academics, as it contains con-
tradictions between the stated policy goals and practice. (Del Sarto–Schumacher 2005; 
Vallelersundi 2004; Tocci–Cassarini 2011; Tocci 2011) According to many, the EU and 
its MSs, in implementing the Mediterranean Policy through a more realistic and pragmatic 
approach, has placed more emphasis on economic and security issues than on normative 
goals. While the EU kept trying to convince the partner countries of the necessity of political 
and economic reforms, it put up with the existence of authoritarian (but pro-Western) 
regimes in favour of regional stability and secure energy resources. Regimes that assisted 
in tackling the migration crisis also found favour. It is not surprising, therefore, that from 
time to time the EU and its MSs have been criticised as hypocritical. (Hansen–Marsh 2015)
The last twenty years, and especially the Arab Spring, have shown that the lack of 
political will among the Southern Mediterranean partners, the low level of financial support 
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provided by the EU, and the different foreign policy interests of the MSs, mean that the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy has had little impact on the democratisation and securitisation 
processes of the region. From time to time the EU has struggled to tackle challenges 
collectively (like in the case of Libya). Emerging crises posed serious security challenges to 
the EU. The lack of a new European security strategy hindered, until recently, the adoption 
of appropriate answers.
The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy adopted in 
2016 represents a more pragmatic approach, focusing on the state and societal resilience of 
the region. According to Sven Biscop, the Global Strategy signals a return to Realpolitik, 
and a balance between “dreamy idealism and unprincipled pragmatism”. The GS speaks 
of “principled pragmatism”. Compared to the previous security strategy of the EU 
(2003), the GS takes into account its barriers, and it is less optimistic about the success of 
democracy transfer. (Biscop 2016) The priority placed on the state and societal resilience 
of the Southern neighbours clearly shows the turn away from the EU’s normative role.
Conclusions
Despite the ambitions of 2003, namely the creation of the Ring of Friends, today a ring of 
instability encompasses the EU. After the Arab Spring and the crisis in Ukraine, the security 
situation has deteriorated dramatically. Economic and financial problems remain, the mi-
gration crisis is unresolved, and growing Euroscepticism and the Brexit threaten to hinder 
any effective EU response. II is clear that the review of the neighbourhood policy, a key 
instrument of the EU’s common foreign and security policy, was accelerated by the Arab 
Spring. For a variety of reasons though, such as lower-than-expected available resources, 
the lack of a common will, and the lack of political engagement by the partner states, little 
substantive progress has been made.
Before the Arab Spring overturned the status quo within the MENA region, the pos-
sibility of dialogue between the partner states was considered the most important result of 
the Euro–Mediterranean Partnership. It strengthened the EU’s role in the region, as well. 
Enhancing economic and political relations and, in the long term, accelerating the economic 
development of the Southern Mediterranean partners were among the crucial aims of 
regional and bilateral forms of cooperation.
In recent years, demographic, economic, and social processes led to political in-
stability, social unrest, and increased security risks in the Southern Mediterranean 
region. Until the review of the ENP in 2011, the EU’s Mediterranean policy, despite 
the normative ambitions of the EU, essentially focused on the security aspects characterized 
by the  pragmatic-realistic approach of the capitals, and seemingly turned a blind eye 
to the pro-Western authoritarian systems. Thus, instead of bottom-up processes with 
an uncertain end, non-democratic governments regarded as guarantees of the political 
stability were supported. During the Arab Spring this kind of approach was discredited in 
the eyes of the people, despite tangible results; therefore, it could not give truly successful 
responses to the challenges. The effective implementation of this policy was hindered further 
by the limited level of regional economic integration between Southern Mediterranean 
countries. Irregular migration and refugee flows in the past few years have also pointed out 
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that the EU’s prosperity exporting efforts had not succeeded in the closest region to the EU, 
and the social and political problems continue to grow.
The difficulties of the multilateral Euro–Mediterranean policy have been recognized 
several times; when it was complemented by the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, it 
became obvious that instead of realising regional integration under the multilateral umbrella 
of the ENP–UfM, relations based on bilateral agreements were intensifying. After the Arab 
Spring, it became clear that the EU could not offer a new “Mediterranean Marshall Plan” 
to this region, despite the expectations of several stakeholders. The contradictory trends 
suggested that the EU’s relations with this region were not strengthened by these processes. 
Competition between global and regional powers was intensified by the absence of a real 
hegemon, and the regional dynamics turned increasingly chaotic.
In the new framework of the security system of the early nineties, when the insti-
tutionalised structure of the Euro–Mediterranean relations was built, U.S. hegemony 
clearly prevailed in the region. The EU’s evolving “soft-civilian power” was supposed to 
complement the hard power of the USA. During the last decades, the international system 
has changed dramatically, and new players with global strategic interests have emerged in 
the multipolar environment of the Mediterranean region.
It has become clear that the normative and soft power offered by the EU is insufficient. 
The EU had only a limited impact on the transition processes of the countries in the region 
(e.g. the strengthening of civil society). It is obvious that in the future, the EU must use both 
soft and hard foreign policy instruments in the framework of the comprehensive approach 
elaborated in 2013 and the integrated approach introduced by the Global Strategy. In 2016 
Jean-Claude Juncker noted in his State of the Union speech: “Soft power is no longer 
enough […] in the EU’s increasingly dangerous neighbourhood.” It is not coincidental 
that following the review of the ENP, supporting stabilisation became a top priority. (Joint 
Communication 2015)
The EU has a long history of ambitions but in reality provided unsuccessful and 
insufficient plans for the Mediterranean region. It is not surprising that the Global Strategy 
(GS) adopted in 2016 is trying to find a perfect balance between idealism and sometimes 
inconvenient reality has introduced the approach of “principled pragmatism”. (European 
External Action Service 2016)
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